Coordination and Motivation in Flat Hierarchies: The Impact of the Adjudication Culture

Rabindra Nath Chakraborty and Ernst Mohr

Economica, 2005, vol. 72, issue 288, 563-576

Abstract: This paper considers a variation of the partnership game with imperfect public information, in which teams are semi‐autonomous. The only hierarchical intervention in teamwork is when a superior is called in by a team member to adjudicate alleged cases of free‐riding or unjustified lateral punishment (flat hierarchy) according to publicly known adjudicative rules (adjudication culture), using for statistical inference a publicly known organizational norm for teamwork cooperation. It is shown that it is advantageous to set a non‐elitist organizational teamwork norm. Furthermore, fairness in adjudication is valuable for economic reasons alone.

Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0335.2005.00432.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:econom:v:72:y:2005:i:288:p:563-576

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0013-0427

Access Statistics for this article

Economica is currently edited by Frank Cowell, Tore Ellingsen and Alan Manning

More articles in Economica from London School of Economics and Political Science Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().