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Privatization Policy in an International Oligopoly

Pehr-Johan Norbäck () and Lars Persson

Economica, 2005, vol. 72, issue 288, 635-653

Abstract: This paper studies privatization policy in an international oligopoly. The argument that equal treatment of foreign investors will be detrimental to domestic welfare by shifting profits from domestic to foreign firms is shown to be less relevant in privatization auctions than for greenfield FDI. This is because such profit shifts are paid for in part by foreign firms in the bidding competition for the privatized firm in the auction. It is also shown that small local equity requirements are likely to be beneficial, but large ones are counterproductive, preventing welfare‐enhancing foreign acquisitions.

Date: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:72:y:2005:i:288:p:635-653