Value Judgments and Value Neutrality in Economics

Philippe Mongin

Economica, 2006, vol. 73, issue 290, 257-286

Abstract: The paper analyses economic evaluations by distinguishing evaluative statements from actual value judgments. From this basis, it compares four solutions to the value neutrality problem in economics. After rebutting the strong theses about neutrality (normative economics is illegitimate) and non‐neutrality (the social sciences are value‐impregnated), the paper settles the case between the weak neutrality thesis (common in welfare economics) and a novel, weak non‐neutrality thesis that extends the realm of normative economics more widely than the other weak thesis does.

Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0335.2006.00501.x

Related works:
Working Paper: Value judgments and value neutrality in economics (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:econom:v:73:y:2006:i:290:p:257-286

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0013-0427

Access Statistics for this article

Economica is currently edited by Frank Cowell, Tore Ellingsen and Alan Manning

More articles in Economica from London School of Economics and Political Science Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().