Internalizing Team Production Externalities through Delegation: The British Passenger Rail Sector as an Example

Rafael Hortala‐vallve and Miguel Sanchez Villalba
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Rafael Hortala-Vallve

Economica, 2010, vol. 77, issue 308, 785-792

Abstract: We show that in situations of team production, the associated externality between workers can be partially internalized via the delegation of authority of contracting rights, thus improving the overall efficiency of organizations. A delegated structure provides further incentives to individuals in higher tiers of the hierarchy because it makes them residual claimants. Our model sheds light on recent debates about the organization of the British passenger rail sector.

Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0335.2009.00787.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:econom:v:77:y:2010:i:308:p:785-792

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0013-0427

Access Statistics for this article

Economica is currently edited by Frank Cowell, Tore Ellingsen and Alan Manning

More articles in Economica from London School of Economics and Political Science Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().