 How Do NYPD Officers Respond to Terror Threats?Steven Lehrer () and Louis‐Pierre Lepage Economica, 2020, vol. 87, issue 347, 638-661 Abstract: Using data from the Stop‐and‐Frisk programme of the New York Police Department (NYPD), we evaluate the impact of a specific terrorist attack threat from Al Qaeda on policing behaviour in New York City. We find that after the Department of Homeland Security raised the alert level in response to this threat, people categorized as ‘Other’ by the NYPD, including Arabs, were significantly more likely to be frisked and have force used against them, yet were not more likely to be arrested. These individuals were in turn less likely to be frisked or have force used against them immediately after the alert level returned to its baseline level. Further, evidence suggests that these impacts were larger in magnitude in police precincts that have higher concentrations of mosques. Our results are consistent with profiling by police officers leading to low‐productivity stops, but we cannot rule out that it constitutes efficient policing given important differences between deterrence of terrorism versus other crimes. Date: 2020 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:econom:v:87:y:2020:i:347:p:638-661 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Economica is currently edited by Frank Cowell, Tore Ellingsen and Alan Manning More articles in Economica from London School of Economics and Political Science Contact information at EDIRC. |
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