Consequences of inconvenient information: Evidence from sentencing disparities

Michal Šoltés

Economica, 2023, vol. 90, issue 360, 1307-1334

Abstract: Inconvenient information about the performance of public institutions may undermine public trust. In an experiment, I test how information about sentencing disparities among judges in the Czech Republic affects respondents' perception of the judicial system. I find no effect on respondents' declared institutional trust and willingness to rely on the formal judicial system. Instead, the information marginally increased respondents' policy involvement: they became more likely to (i) sign a petition that invites politicians to address the underlying issue, and (ii) consider the fairness of the judicial system to be a more important policy issue. The increased interest in signing the petition was driven by mothers, who are arguably more sensitive to the particular treatment information in the presented case of a failure to pay alimony.

Date: 2023
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https://doi.org/10.1111/ecca.12483

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Working Paper: Consequences of Inconvenient Information: Evidence from Sentencing Disparities (2022)
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