The determinants of trust: findings from large, representative samples in six OECD countries

Roxanne Kovacs, Maurice Dunaiski, Matteo Galizzi, Gianluca Grimalda, Rafael Hortala‐Vallve, Fabrice Murtin and Louis Putterman

Economica, 2024, vol. 91, issue 364, 1521-1552

Abstract: Trust is key for economic and social development. But why do we trust others? We study the motives behind trust in strangers using an experimental trust game played by 7236 participants, in six samples representative of the general populations of Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the UK and the USA. We examine the broadest range of potential determinants of trustor sending to date, including risk tolerance, preferences for redistribution, and conformity. We find that even though self‐interest, indicated by expected returns, is relevant for trustor behaviour, the most important correlate of sending is participants' altruism or fairness concerns, as measured by giving in a dictator game. We also find that in our large and representative sample, behaviour in the trust game and responses in a trust survey are significantly correlated, and that similar correlates—altruism in particular—are relevant for both.

Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecca.12549

Related works:
Working Paper: The determinants of trust: findings from large, representative samples in six OECD countries (2024)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:econom:v:91:y:2024:i:364:p:1521-1552

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0013-0427

Access Statistics for this article

Economica is currently edited by Frank Cowell, Tore Ellingsen and Alan Manning

More articles in Economica from London School of Economics and Political Science Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().