Economics at your fingertips  

Do Gatt Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments?

Robert Staiger () and Guido Tabellini ()

Economics and Politics, 1999, vol. 11, issue 2, 109-144

Abstract: We investigate empirically whether GATT rules may have helped the US government make trade policy commitments to its private sector. We study choices under two distinct environments. One environment is the determination of sectoral exclusions in the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations. The other is the determination of tariff responses under GATT's escape clause. In each environment the US government was faced with a similar decision, but only in the former environment did GATT rules serve as a potential commitment device. Comparing decisions made across these two environments, we find evidence that GATT rules did help the US government make domestic trade policy commitments that it could not have made in the absence of these rules. Copyright 1999 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..

Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) ... &year=1999&part=null link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0954-1985

Access Statistics for this article

Economics and Politics is currently edited by Peter Rosendorff

More articles in Economics and Politics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

Page updated 2020-01-24
Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:11:y:1999:i:2:p:109-144