Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information

John Duggan

Economics and Politics, 2000, vol. 12, issue 2, 109-135

Abstract: An infinite sequence of elections with no term limits is modelled. In each period a challenger with privately known preferences is randomly drawn from the electorate to run against the incumbent, and the winner chooses a policy outcome in a one‐dimensional issue space. One theorem is that there exists an equilibrium in which the median voter is decisive: an incumbent wins re‐election if and only if his most recent policy choice gives the median voter a payoff at least as high as he would expect from a challenger. The equilibrium is symmetric, stationary, and the behavior of voters is consistent with both retrospective and prospective voting. A second theorem is that, in fact, it is the only equilibrium possessing the latter four conditions — decisiveness of the median voter is implied by them.

Date: 2000
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