A Model of Inequality and Interest Group Politics

Inderjit Kohli and Nirvikar Singh

Economics and Politics, 2001, vol. 13, issue 2, 185-200

Abstract: In this paper we examine inequality of process and inequality of outcomes in interest group politics. The model has interest groups that compete for rents in a non‐cooperative game. It allows for a self‐interested rent‐setting political decision‐maker, and democratic or popular pressure as a check on that self‐interest. We consider differences in the effectiveness and pre‐commitment abilities of interest groups. We show that: (i) the costs of influence activities may be highest when groups are relatively equal in their effectiveness; (ii) if social welfare incorporates enough concern for equity of outcomes, that ranking is reversed; (iii) depending on voter responsiveness to rent‐setting, the political decision‐maker may set rents to be higher or lower, when increases in inequality of effectiveness lower the unit costs of rent‐seeking.

Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0343.00089

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:2:p:185-200

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0954-1985

Access Statistics for this article

Economics and Politics is currently edited by Peter Rosendorff

More articles in Economics and Politics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().