Electoral Rules, Political Systems, and Institutional Quality

Ugo
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Ugo Gianluigi Panizza

Economics and Politics, 2001, vol. 13, issue 3, 311-342

Abstract: This paper explores the links between political rules and institutional quality. The paper concentrates on two political measures: the presence of checks and balances in the political system and an index of political particularism that measures the incentives for politicians to build personal support bases. The paper finds a positive correlation between checks and balances and institutional quality. It also finds that intermediate levels of particularism are associated with higher institutional quality.

Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0343.00095

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:3:p:311-342

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0954-1985

Access Statistics for this article

Economics and Politics is currently edited by Peter Rosendorff

More articles in Economics and Politics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().