Harmonizing External Quotas in an FTA: A Step Backward?

Olivier Cadot, Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga

Economics and Politics, 2002, vol. 14, issue 3, 259-282

Abstract: This paper explores how political–economy forces shape quantitative barriers against the rest of the world in an FTA. We show that whereas the dilution of lobbying power in an FTA typically leads to a relaxation of external quotas, this result is likely to be overturned as integration deepens. In particular, we show that cooperation among member countries on the level of their external quotas, cross–border lobbying by import–competing interests in the free–trade area, and the consolidation of national external quotas into a single one, all lead to stiffer restrictions against imports from the rest of the world. We also show that, unlike tariffs, endogenous quotas are not crucially affected by the presence of rules of origin.

Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0343.00108

Related works:
Working Paper: Harmonizing External Quotas in a FTA: A Step Backward? (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:14:y:2002:i:3:p:259-282

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0954-1985

Access Statistics for this article

Economics and Politics is currently edited by Peter Rosendorff

More articles in Economics and Politics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().