Concessional Amnesty and the Politics of Immigration Reforms

Nancy Chau

Economics and Politics, 2003, vol. 15, issue 2, 193-224

Abstract: This paper establishes a political support model of immigration reforms. The analysis highlights the distinction between border enforcement and employer sanction measures in that the former can be more aptly characterized as an income transfer from employer to native labor interests, whereas the latter generates deadweight losses that are borne entirely by producers. We show that while amnesty may appear to run contrary to the original intent of the immigration reform, it may nevertheless facilitate rent capture by the politician by “wiping the slate clean” and reducing the deadweight loss of employer sanction measures.

Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:15:y:2003:i:2:p:193-224

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