SIGNALING THROUGH POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS: ELECTIONS AS A REVELATION MECHANISM

Costas Roumanias

Economics and Politics, 2005, vol. 17, issue 3, 367-392

Abstract: Political campaigns are usually seen either as a way of passing information about candidates' intended policies to the voters or as a political liability of the candidates towards the interest groups that finance them. We provide a different interpretation of political campaigns using a political competition model for campaign promises and spending. In a principal–agent framework, elections are shown to be a truth revelation mechanism, in which the principal (voters) induces truthful revelation of ability by the agent (candidates). Campaign promises and spending coexist as an integral part of this mechanism. Political competition is then derived endogenously.

Date: 2005
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