PERFORMANCE CONTINGENT PROTECTION*
William Kaempfer (),
Edward Tower () and
Thomas D. Willett
Economics and Politics, 1989, vol. 1, issue 3, 261-275
In this paper we ask how to construct a tariff or quota schedule which depends on the behavior of a domestic monopsonistic monopolist in order to achieve the best tradeoff between two objectives of a government. We consider various political and economic tradeoffs which could face the policy maker: aggregate welfare versus industry profits, output and imports; and trade barrier revenue versus industry profits and domestic price. In all cases considered, performance contingent protection which takes the form either of a tariff which depends on domestic output or a quota which depends on the price charged is generally superior to a fixed tariff or quota and is sufficient to achieve optimality.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:1:y:1989:i:3:p:261-275
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0954-1985
Access Statistics for this article
Economics and Politics is currently edited by Peter Rosendorff
More articles in Economics and Politics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().