POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL CHECKS ON CORRUPTION: EVIDENCE FROM AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENTS
James E. Alt and
David Lassen ()
Economics and Politics, 2008, vol. 20, issue 1, 33-61
This paper investigates the effects of checks and balances on corruption. Within a presidential system, effective separation of powers is achieved under a divided government, with the executive and legislative branches being controlled by different political parties. When government is unified, no effective separation exists even within a presidential system, but, we argue, can be partially restored by having an accountable judiciary. Our empirical findings show that a divided government and elected, rather than appointed, state supreme court judges are associated with lower corruption and, furthermore, that the effect of an accountable judiciary is stronger under a unified government, where the government cannot control itself.
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Working Paper: Political and Judicial Checks on Corruption: Evidence from American State Governments (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:20:y:2008:i:1:p:33-61
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