INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES NOW AND BENEFITS TOMORROW: HOW SOON IS TOMORROW?

Pierre-Guillaume Méon, Khalid Sekkat and Laurent Weill

Economics and Politics, 2009, vol. 21, issue 2, 319-357

Abstract: This paper investigates the timing of the impact of changes in checks and balances on macroeconomic efficiency in a panel of countries. Using Battese and Coelli's one‐stage approach, we find that increasing checks and balances results in greater efficiency. Furthermore, the impact of institutional changes on efficiency is delayed, with a full effect showing after five to six years. This finding remains robust after distinguishing developed and developing countries, including country‐fixed effects and using alternative functional forms of the production frontier and alternative measures of checks and balances. The relation is also robust to controlling for endogeneity.

Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2009.00351.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:21:y:2009:i:2:p:319-357

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0954-1985

Access Statistics for this article

Economics and Politics is currently edited by Peter Rosendorff

More articles in Economics and Politics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().