DETERRENCE: CREDIBILITY AND PROPORTIONALITY

Daniel Arce and Todd Sandler

Economics and Politics, 2009, vol. 21, issue 3, 384-408

Abstract: This paper extends the analysis of deterrence to examine terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and rogue nations. Such situations are characterized by differential pre‐emptive and response capacity, in contrast to the traditional deterrence literature on nuclear superpowers, where such factors are absent. We focus on the credibility of deterrence responses to pre‐emption and show that credible (subgame‐perfect) responses are rarely proportional. The analysis is also extended to asymmetric deterrence scenarios whereby credibility and proportionality depend on the potential aggressor's access to conflict technology and the responder's preferences for indirect conflict vs. the status quo.

Date: 2009
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