CAFTA, CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS, AND THE ROLE OF SPECIAL INTERESTS

James DeVault

Economics and Politics, 2010, vol. 22, issue 3, 282-297

Abstract: This paper analyzes the passage of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) in 2005, paying particular attention to the role of campaign contributions. The CAFTA vote is significant in that the context in which it occurred was one in which campaign contributions were more likely to influence votes. By more carefully identifying the special interest groups actively involved in the CAFTA debate, I provide a more accurate assessment of the impact of the contributions made by these groups. I use instrumental variables to control for the potential endogeneity of campaign contributions and find that these contributions played at best a secondary role in determining the outcome of the CAFTA vote in the U.S. House of Representatives.

Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2009.00362.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:22:y:2010:i:3:p:282-297

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0954-1985

Access Statistics for this article

Economics and Politics is currently edited by Peter Rosendorff

More articles in Economics and Politics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().