Trade Policy in Lobbying Equilibrium: With Non-Traded and Traded Final Goods and Intermediate Inputs

Ram C. Acharya

Economics and Politics, 2015, vol. 27, issue 2, 313-336

Abstract: type="main" xml:id="ecpo12058-abs-0001">

The paper derives trade policies endogenously for final consumption and intermediate input industries in the presence of a non-traded sector. Contrary to what the existing literature suggests, results show that there is no definite relation between lobbying status and the direction of trade policy of an industry. Trade protection of an industry depends on how its consumption (horizontal) and production (vertical) linkages with other industries reinforce or cancel out its lobbying efforts. To cite a few results, (i) an organized industry may face trade tax, whereas an unorganized one may obtain protection; (ii) an organized downstream industry may not be able to impose trade tax to an unorganized upstream industry, (iii) an organized upstream industry may not hurt unorganized downstream industry, (iv) lobby for non-traded industry alone can influence trade policies, and (v) lobby for traded industry affects the size of the non-traded sector in the economy.

Date: 2015
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