Nothing to hide: Commitment to, compliance with, and impact of the special data dissemination standard
Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati,
Arusha Cooray and
Economics and Politics, 2018, vol. 30, issue 1, 55-77
Understanding why states voluntarily cede power to international institutions, and if those institutions fulfill their stated goals, remain a pressing question in international relations. In order to evaluate the material and normative logics that may drive this type of behavior, this paper considers state commitment to and compliance with the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) initiative launched by the IMF in 1996. This effort seeks to enhance the availability of comprehensive economic data based on best dissemination practices to facilitate pursuing sound macroeconomic policies. Using panel data on 120 countries during the 1996â€“2011 period, we find that commitment to the SDDS occurs when costs for states are low, and that compliance with the SDDS initiative is associated with increased data transparency after controlling for selfâ€ section bias. Our results are robust to controlling for endogeneity, alternative sample, and estimation methods.
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