DANGO: JAPAN'S PRICE‐FIXING CONSPIRACIES

John McMillan

Economics and Politics, 1991, vol. 3, issue 3, 201-218

Abstract: This paper addresses two questions about collusion in the Japanese construction industry. First, what mechanisms are used for enforcing the collusive agreement, for dividing the spoils, and for preventing the entry of new firms seeking a share of the collusive profits? Second, how much are prices raised as a result of the collusion?

Date: 1991
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