ANARCHY, UNCERTAINTY, AND THE EMERGENCE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

Karl Wärneryd

Economics and Politics, 1993, vol. 5, issue 1, 1-14

Abstract: This paper investigates whether Lockean first claimer property rights should be expected to emerge in anarchy. Individuals behind a veil of uncertainty about their future wealth decide independently whether to commit to using fcrce. Neither the contractarian hypothesis that a thicker veil of uncertainty supports more co‐operation nor Demsetz's hypothesis that well‐defined property rights emerge as the value of the externality from not having private property increases is unambiguously implied by the model.

Date: 1993
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1993.tb00063.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:5:y:1993:i:1:p:1-14

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0954-1985

Access Statistics for this article

Economics and Politics is currently edited by Peter Rosendorff

More articles in Economics and Politics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().