THE MARKET FOR CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS: EVIDENCE FOR THE U.S. SENATE 1980–1986*

James Snyder

Economics and Politics, 1993, vol. 5, issue 3, 219-240

Abstract: This paper tests a simple asset market model of campaign contributions, using data from recent U.S. Senate races. When applied to “investor” PACs, the model performs surprisingly well, and suggests that the contributions market is relatively efficient. When applied to “ideological” PACs, political parties, and individuals, the model is rejected. The results not only provide empirical support for the model, but also point out important differences in the apparent motives behind different types of contributions.

Date: 1993
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1993.tb00076.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:5:y:1993:i:3:p:219-240

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0954-1985

Access Statistics for this article

Economics and Politics is currently edited by Peter Rosendorff

More articles in Economics and Politics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().