WINNER‐HELP‐LOSER GROUP FORMATION IN RENT‐SEEKING CONTESTS*

Kyung Baik

Economics and Politics, 1994, vol. 6, issue 2, 147-162

Abstract: We define a winner‐help‐loser group in a rent‐seeking contest as follows: (a) the member players compete noncooperatively to win the rent, and (b) if a member player wins the rent, he helps the losing member players according to the previously written agreement. We demonstrate that one and only one winner‐help‐loser group is formed voluntarily. One important consequence of such group formation is that rent dissipation is small relative to individual rent seeking. Therefore, such group formation decreases the social cost associated with rent seeking and thus decreases the economic inefficiency of rent seeking.

Date: 1994
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