THE PROFITABILITY OF COLONIAL INVESTMENT

Herschel Grossman and Murat Iyigun

Economics and Politics, 1995, vol. 7, issue 3, 229-241

Abstract: This paper develops a model for studying colonial investment in which the metropolitan government restricts the amount of investment in the colony in order to maximize the net profits earned in the colony. The model explicitly includes the threat of subversive activity by the indigenous colonial population. The analysis suggests why historically some countries but not others became colonies and why many colonies that were initially profitable subsequently become unprofitable and were abandoned. The model also has implications for the amount of investment in colonies, the allocation of indigenous colonial labor between production and subversive activity, and the distribution of income between colonial firms and the indigenous population.

Date: 1995
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1995.tb00112.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:7:y:1995:i:3:p:229-241

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0954-1985

Access Statistics for this article

Economics and Politics is currently edited by Peter Rosendorff

More articles in Economics and Politics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().