THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF QUOTA RENTS IN A DYNAMIC INTERNATIONAL TRADE MODEL*

Shannon Mitchell

Economics and Politics, 1995, vol. 7, issue 3, 243-261

Abstract: This paper considers the implications of allowing quota rents to become capitalized. Capitalized quota rents crowd out physical capital in savers’portfolios, reducing the capital stock. Capitalization of quota rents also makes removal of the quota politically more difficult, since those currently alive may not be able to fully compensate the losers before the losers die. I use an overlapping generations model to provide examples which illustrate the difficulty of removing a quota once its rents have been fully capitalized. This work has implications for any policy which could lead to capitalized rents.

Date: 1995
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1995.tb00113.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:7:y:1995:i:3:p:243-261

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0954-1985

Access Statistics for this article

Economics and Politics is currently edited by Peter Rosendorff

More articles in Economics and Politics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().