The Explanatory Power of Game Theory in International Politics: Syrian–Israeli Crisis Interactions, 1951–87

Joel M. Guttman

Economics and Politics, 1997, vol. 9, issue 1, 71-85

Abstract: The present paper assesses the usefulness of game theory in explaining crisis interactions between Israel and Syria. We begin with the simplest game‐theoretic tool for analyzing strategic situations: the one‐shot 2×2 game. By analyzing the various episodes of the protracted Syrian‐‐Israeli conflict as one‐shot 2×2 games, we avoid the multiplicity of equilibria of the infinitely repeated game and the difficulty of specifying an endpoint of a finitely repeated game. The pure strategy Nash equilibria of these one‐shot games are treated as theoretical predictions and are compared with the observed outcomes.

Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:9:y:1997:i:1:p:71-85

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