Sequencing of Economic Reforms in the Presence of Political Constraints

Cesar Martinelli and Mariano Tommasi

Economics and Politics, 1997, vol. 9, issue 2, 115-131

Abstract: This paper presents a model portraying a country in a political deadlock about economic reform proposals in which certain measures hurt strongly‐organized interests. We show that when governments are unable to precommit and interest groups have veto power, only far‐reaching reforms (even if quite costly) have hope of success. The model intends to explain why in recent years several Latin American countries have opted for radical reform.

Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0343.92024

Related works:
Working Paper: Sequencing of Economic Reforms in the Presence of Political Constraints (1993)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:9:y:1997:i:2:p:115-131

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0954-1985

Access Statistics for this article

Economics and Politics is currently edited by Peter Rosendorff

More articles in Economics and Politics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().