Rationality in a Political‐Economic Environment

R. Grafstein

Economics and Politics, 1997, vol. 9, issue 2, 151-172

Abstract: This paper develops a rational expectations model of the circle of public opinion and policy implicit in working democracies. The executive branch of government, in particular, takes into account its own preferences and, indirectly, those of the voters, which are not constant but depend on the policy context in which they are formed. As a result, policies and voter preferences become interdependent stochastic processes rather than solutions of static optimization problems. This interdependence has specific implications for policy and opinion. Most striking, when citizens' opinions develop in this environment, the existence of rationally held belief systems is consistent with the pattern of opinion instability Converse attributes to nonattitudes.

Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:9:y:1997:i:2:p:151-172

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