On Optimal Enclosure and Optimal Timing of Enclosure

Ngo Long

The Economic Record, 1994, vol. 70, issue 211, 368-372

Abstract: This paper demonstrates that the enforcement of property rights by enclosing properties under common access is, in general, socially suboptimal: the timing of enclosure may be inappropriate, causing inefficiency. It is argued that the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics applies for a given collection of production sets, while enclosure implies a choice over collections of production sets

Date: 1994
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