A Theoretical Analysis of Credit Card Reform in Australia
Joshua Gans () and
Stephen King ()
The Economic Record, 2003, vol. 79, issue 247, 462-472
The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) moved to reform credit card associations by increasing entry, allowing merchants to surcharge for card payments and regulating the interchange fee. We develop a simple model of payment systems designed to analyse the impact of these reforms. We build on the RBA's main assumptions and provide a justification for some of their concerns about excessive card use. Allowing merchants to surcharge may eliminate much of the concern over the interchange fee. On the other hand, the RBA's proposed interchange fee, based entirely on issuer costs, is unlikely to be socially optimal.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecorec:v:79:y:2003:i:247:p:462-472
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0013-0249
Access Statistics for this article
The Economic Record is currently edited by Paul Miller, Glenn Otto and Martin Richardson
More articles in The Economic Record from The Economic Society of Australia Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().