Monotonic Knowledge Models, Cycles, Linear Versions and Auctions with Differential, Finite Information

José A. Rodrigues‐Neto
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jose Alvaro Rodrigues Neto

The Economic Record, 2015, vol. 91, issue S1, 25-37

Abstract: In games of incomplete information where each player's information is represented by a partition of the state space, this paper presents a characterisation of monotonic models in terms of connected partitions and another in terms of versions . A model is monotonic if and only if there is a linear version, and this is true if and only if there is a real‐valued function on the state space such that every partition of the model is connected with respect to this function. These results help us understand the strength of the connectedness assumption on common‐value, second‐price auctions with differential, finite information. We offer a simple sufficient condition for non‐monotonicity to check if models are monotonic.

Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-4932.12193

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecorec:v:91:y:2015:i:s1:p:25-37

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0013-0249

Access Statistics for this article

The Economic Record is currently edited by Paul Miller, Glenn Otto and Martin Richardson

More articles in The Economic Record from The Economic Society of Australia Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().