China's emerging market for property rights: Theoretical and empirical perspectives1
Gary H. Jefferson and
The Economics of Transition, 2002, vol. 10, issue 3, 585-617
his paper contrasts state–directed and market–mediated reform of enterprise ownership rights in transition economies. We evaluate China's emerging market for enterprise ownership rights from the perspective of conditions underpinning the Coase Theorem: the assignment of property rights, the degree of competition, and the nature of transaction costs. China's recent experience suggests that policies designed to expand and support the scope of decentralized, market–based restructuring of ownership rights, even under conditions that deviate widely from the ideal assumptions underlying the Coase Theorem, may prove more beneficial than direct official intervention. JEL classification: G34, K11, L1 and P3.
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