Wage differentials and state‐private sector employment choice in Yugoslavia
Michael Lokshin and
Branko Jovanovic
The Economics of Transition, 2003, vol. 11, issue 3, 463-491
Abstract:
In this study we use the newly available Yugoslavian Labor Force Survey data to investigate wage differentials and employment decisions in the state and private sectors in Yugoslavia. For the analysis we use three empirical models that rely on different statistical assumptions. We extend the standard switching regression model to allow non‐normality in the joint distribution of the error terms. After correcting for the sector selection bias and controlling for workers’ characteristics we find a private sector wage advantage. The wage premium is largest for workers with low education levels and declining for workers with higher educational levels. Given the regulatory and tax policies that pushed the private sector into the informal sphere of the economy during the period covered by our data, we argue that the state/private wage gap is likely to grow in the future. This will make it increasingly difficult for the state sector to attract and retain highly skilled employees.
Date: 2003
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)
Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0351.00153
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:etrans:v:11:y:2003:i:3:p:463-491
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0967-0750
Access Statistics for this article
The Economics of Transition is currently edited by Philippe Aghion and Wendy Carlin
More articles in The Economics of Transition from The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().