Spontaneous (non)emergence of property rights

Leonid Polishchuk and Alexey Savvateev ()

The Economics of Transition, 2004, vol. 12, issue 1, 103-127

Abstract: The paper analyses preferences of private owners over the degree of property rights protection. It is shown that inequality in resource ownership and/or relative inefficiency of production technologies could make wealthier agents favour less than full protection of property rights. If such agents control the choice of a property rights regime, fully secured property rights will not emerge from the grassroots. This conclusion is consistent with the failure to create an efficient property rights system in Russia.

Date: 2004
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0967-0750.2004.00173.x

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