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A market without the ‘right’ property rights

Annette M. Kim

The Economics of Transition, 2004, vol. 12, issue 2, 275-305

Abstract: While Vietnam's reforms provided some of the weakest legal private property rights amongst the transitions countries, cities like Ho Chi Minh City have booming domestic real estate markets. Interestingly, while most properties in 2001 did not have legal title, those on the market did advertise a variety of property rights claims. Employing a hedonic price model to analyse the pattern of prices at which sellers offer properties in Ho Chi Minh City, this study examines how this market values property rights. The findings show that multiple forms of property rights, enforced by highly decentralized state institutions, are operational in this market. Furthermore, legal title itself is not the most valuable form of property right. These findings suggest that the value of property rights emanates from where it is enforced within the particular institutional context of a market.

Date: 2004
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0967-0750.2004.00179.x

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