Housing privatization inÂ Romania: An Antiâ€ commons tragedy?
Robert Buckley () and
The Economics of Transition, 2018, vol. 26, issue 1, 127-145
Over the past three decades, Romanian housing rights changed from a strictly managed public stock to one governed by individual decisionâ€ making. And while it is typical that widespread private ownership provides a basis for a wellâ€ functioning housing market, in Romania this has not been the case. Indeed, rather than creating a market that spontaneously allocates resources efficiently, housing privatization in Romania has created exclusion rights, thus creating an Antiâ€ commons problem. This problem can have effects similar to those of the tragedy of the Commons in which those who share a common good overuse it. In the Antiâ€ commons, in contrast, if too many owners have the right to exclude others from use of a resource, the resource is underused. In both cases, the rights allocation wastes resources.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:etrans:v:26:y:2018:i:1:p:127-145
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0967-0750
Access Statistics for this article
The Economics of Transition is currently edited by Philippe Aghion and Wendy Carlin
More articles in The Economics of Transition from The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().