 Education for the masses? The interaction between wealth, educational and political inequalitiesThe Economics of Transition, 2001, vol. 9, issue 2, 533-552 Abstract: This paper presents a simple model of distribution dynamics, in which the distributions of wealth, education and political power are circularly endogenous. Different levels of education translate into different income and wealth levels. Political power may (or may not) vary with wealth, and in turn affects decisions on the level of public expenditure on education. Since the market for education credit is imperfect, some people might need to rely on public schooling, the quality of which depends on those expenditure levels. As a result, educational opportunities differ along the wealth distribution. The dynamic system displays multiple equilibria, some of which are characterized by a vicious circle of interaction between educational, wealth and political inequalities. These particular equilibria, which are more unequal, are also shown to be inefficient in terms of aggregate output levels. Switching equilibria may be achieved through redistribution of political power. JEL classification: D31, D63. Date: 2001 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:etrans:v:9:y:2001:i:2:p:533-552 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article The Economics of Transition is currently edited by Philippe Aghion and Wendy Carlin More articles in The Economics of Transition from The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Contact information at EDIRC. |
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