Equity Issuance, CEO Turnover and Corporate Governance

David Hillier, Scott Linn and Patrick McColgan

European Financial Management, 2005, vol. 11, issue 4, 515-538

Abstract: There is substantial evidence on the effect of external market discipline on chief executive turnover decisions in poorly performing companies. In this study we present evidence on the role of institutional monitoring in these decisions through the equity issuance process. We find that firms which undertake equity offerings are associated with an increased rate of forced CEO turnover that is focused on the managers of poorly performing companies. At the same time, equity offerings increase the likelihood of a new CEO being appointed from outside the current management team. We also provide evidence that independent boards are more likely to forcibly remove CEOs from their position, although this is not conditional on poor performance.

Date: 2005
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