Economics at your fingertips  

Managerial Stock Options and the Hedging Premium

Niclas Hagelin, Martin Holmen, John D. Knopf and Bengt Pramborg

European Financial Management, 2007, vol. 13, issue 4, 721-741

Abstract: Previous studies have found mixed evidence on whether hedging increases firm value. Some studies have shown that managerial incentives may influence firm hedging. In this paper we provide evidence that when hedging is based upon incentives from managers' options, firm value decreases.

Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1354-7798

Access Statistics for this article

European Financial Management is currently edited by John Doukas

More articles in European Financial Management from European Financial Management Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

Page updated 2020-07-05
Handle: RePEc:bla:eufman:v:13:y:2007:i:4:p:721-741