Managerial Stock Options and the Hedging Premium
John D. Knopf and
European Financial Management, 2007, vol. 13, issue 4, 721-741
Previous studies have found mixed evidence on whether hedging increases firm value. Some studies have shown that managerial incentives may influence firm hedging. In this paper we provide evidence that when hedging is based upon incentives from managers' options, firm value decreases.
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