Bank Risk Dynamics Where Assets are Risky Debt Claims

Sharon Peleg†Lazar and Alon Raviv

European Financial Management, 2017, vol. 23, issue 1, 3-31

Abstract: The structural approach views firm's equity as a call option on the value of its assets, which motivates stockholders to increase risk. However, since bank assets are risky debt claims, bank equity resembles a subordinated debt. Using this assumption, and considering the strategic interaction between a bank and its debtor, we argue that risk shifting is limited to states in which the debtor is in financial distress. Furthermore, risk shifting increases with bankruptcy costs and decreases with bank capital. Thus, increasing a bank's capital affects stability, not only through the additional capital buffer, but also by affecting the risk shifting incentive.

Date: 2017
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