Tax Havens, Tax Evasion and Tax Information Exchange Agreements in the OECD
David Kemme (),
Bhavik Parikh and
European Financial Management, 2017, vol. 23, issue 3, 519-542
Using data on Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI), we find a positive relationship between higher tax burden and OECD residentsâ€™ tax evasion, especially via tax havens. Contrary to established investor preference for certain country characteristics, we find they are less important to tax evaders who value privacy and want to remain undetected by their home tax authorities. We find very limited evidence that OECD Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAS) reduce tax evasion, controlling for other determinants of overall OECD FPI. Without the US in the OECD sample, tax havens play a lesser role and OECD policies appear to make a marginal impact.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:eufman:v:23:y:2017:i:3:p:519-542
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