Investment and asset securitization with an option‐for‐guarantee swap

Zhaojun Yang

European Financial Management, 2020, vol. 26, issue 4, 1006-1030

Abstract: This article addresses the investment and financing decisions of entrepreneurs entering into option‐for‐guarantee swaps (OGSs). OGSs increase investment option value significantly. Entrepreneurs initially accelerate their investments and then postpone them as funding gaps grow. Guarantee costs increase with project risks when the funding gap is sufficiently small or large, but the opposite holds true otherwise. Investments are postponed when project risks, effective tax rates, or bankruptcy costs increase. Surprisingly, the higher the project risk, the more the entrepreneur will borrow, with a much higher leverage than predicted by classic models. Entrepreneurs can use OGSs to securitize their assets.

Date: 2020
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https://doi.org/10.1111/eufm.12250

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