Does the one man show pay? Theory and evidence on the dual CEO revisited

Jay Dahya and Nickolaos Travlos

European Financial Management, 2000, vol. 6, issue 1, 85-98

Abstract: Contrary to the view expressed in several countries and the corresponding pressure exerted by shareholder activists and regulators to separate the titles of CEO and Board Chairman, this study proposes that there is an optimal board composition for each firm, which varies across firms and over time. A review of the extant empirical evidence reveals that most prior studies bypass this notion which raises serious implications for related empirical studies. In addition, this study documents striking differences in leadership structures between the US and the UK and calls for further research in an international context.

Date: 2000
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