The Deterring Role of the Medium of Payment in Takeover Contests: Theory and Evidence from the UK

Philippe Cornu and Dusan Isakov

European Financial Management, 2000, vol. 6, issue 4, 423-440

Abstract: The deterring role of the medium of payment in a takeover contest is analysed from the point of view of the bidder. Cash, debt and equity are considered as alternative mediums of payment, and the bidder equilibrium strategies are specified following the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium requirements for a signalling game. The model predicts notably that cash offers signal a high‐valuing bidder, strongly determined to acquire the target firm. Moreover, cash offers deter competition better than debt or equity offers. The theoretical results are validated with data from the UK over 1995–96.

Date: 2000
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https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-036X.00133

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Working Paper: The Deterring Role of the Medium of Payment in Takeover Contests: Theory and Evidence from the UK (1998)
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