Share Holder Wealth Effects of Corporate Selloffs: Impact of Growth Opportunities, Economic Cycle and Bargaining Power

George Alexandrou and Sudi Sudarsanam

European Financial Management, 2001, vol. 7, issue 2, 237-258

Abstract: Most of the existing empirical evidence on corporate selloffs documents significant wealth gains for the seller’s shareholders. We investigate the sources of these wealth gains by examining the impact of business and financial strategy, the economic environment during selloff, and the bargaining advantages of the seller including information asymmetry. We find evidence that sellers with growth opportunities and financially strong sellers enjoy higher returns. Selloffs during recessions generate larger wealth gains than those during economic boom. Information asymmetry due to the buyer’s location being different from the purchased division’s gives the seller a bargaining advantage leading to larger wealth gains. Relatively large divestments are more beneficial to seller shareholders than small ones. The study highlights the importance of both firm specific and environmental factors in explaining the wealth gains associated with corporate selloffs.

Date: 2001
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