Performance and Policy of Foundation‐owned Firms in Germany

Markus Herrmann and Günter Franke ()

European Financial Management, 2002, vol. 8, issue 3, 261-279

Abstract: This paper compares performance and policy of foundation‐owned firms and of listed corporations in Germany. Foundations have no owners so that there exist no individuals with financial ownership claims on firms which are wholly owned by foundations. This suggests weaker outside control of foundation‐owned firms implying lower profitability. The empirical findings show a slightly better performance of foundation‐owned firms compared to corporations. Foundation‐owned firms display higher labour intensity, lower labour productivity, and lower salary levels. This policy promotes job security without endangering the viability of foundation‐owned firms.

Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:eufman:v:8:y:2002:i:3:p:261-279

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