Insider Trading after Repurchase Tender Offer Announcements: Timing versus Informed Trading

Henock Louis, Amy X. Sun and Hal White

Financial Management, 2010, vol. 39, issue 1, 301-322

Abstract: Abnormally high net insider selling is commonly observed after repurchase tender offer (RTO) announcements although, on average, firms experience positive abnormal returns in the years after the repurchases. We explore two potential explanations: liquidity trade timing and informed trading. Consistent with the notion that fixed price RTOs are more likely than Dutch‐auction RTOs to signal undervaluation, the results suggest that insider selling after fixed price RTO announcements are driven largely by insiders who time their trades with the repurchase announcements. In contrast, selling after Dutch‐auction RTOs seems to be driven primarily by informed traders who exploit mispricing associated with the repurchase announcements.

Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-053X.2010.01074.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:finmgt:v:39:y:2010:i:1:p:301-322

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0046-3892

Access Statistics for this article

Financial Management is currently edited by William G. Christie

More articles in Financial Management from Financial Management Association International Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().