The Impact of Regulation FD on Institutional Investor Informativeness

Douglas O. Cook and Tian Tang

Financial Management, 2010, vol. 39, issue 3, 1273-1294

Abstract: Although there is conflicting evidence and resulting skepticism regarding the value provided by professional investment management, Gibson, Safieddine, and Sonti (2004) document institutional investor informativeness relative to seasoned equity offering (SEO) purchases. We find that Regulation Fair Disclosure's significantly reduces institutional investors’ ability to identify mispriced SEO firms. Informativeness is diminished not by investors following analysts who have experienced a reduction in forecasting accuracy, but limiting investors’ direct access to private information. This information loss is replaced by reliance on a greater number of public information variables resulting in less consideration for prudence proxies and a liquidity motive and more for higher price momentum.

Date: 2010
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